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Abstract
We consider a model with an infinite number of states of nature, von
Neumann - Morgenstern utilities, where agents have different probabil-
ity beliefs and where short sells are allowed. We show that no-arbitrage
conditions, defined for finite dimensional asset markets models, are not
sufficient to ensure existence of equilibrium in presence of an infinite num-
ber of states of nature. However, if the individually rational utility set U
is compact, we obtain an equilibrium. We give conditions which imply the
compactness of U . We give examples of non-existence of equilibrium when
these conditions do not hold.
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1 Introduction
In finite dimensional markets with short-selling, conditions on agents’ utilities
insuring the existence of equilibria (or equivalent to the existence of equilib-
ria) are well understood. In particular they can be interpreted as no-arbitrage
conditions. In an uncertainty setting, where agents have different beliefs and
different risk aversions, as originally shown by Hart (1974), the no-arbitrage
condition may be interpreted as compatibility of agent’s risk adjusted beliefs.
There is a huge literature on sufficient and necessary conditions for the exis-
tence of equilibria in the line of Hart’s model, where the market is complete.
In finite dimension, one can refer, for instance to Page (1987), Werner (1987),
Nielsen (1989), Page and Wooders (1995, 1996), Allouch (1999), Allouch et alii
(2000), Won and Yannelis (2008).
When the number of assets is infinite, and the market is complete, the no-
arbitrage condition used for finite dimension do not imply existence of equi-
librium. The standard assumption is to assume that the individually rational
utility set is compact ( see e.g. Cheng (1991), Brown and Werner (1995), Dana
and Le Van (1996), Dana et al (1997), Dana and Le Van (2000), Le Van and
Truong Xuan (2001)).1
In this paper, we consider a model with an infinite number of states of nature, a
finite number of agents and Von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities with different
expectations.
More precisely, we consider a model where the utility of agent i is
U i(xi) =
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis)
where pii is her belief and xi is her consumption. The commodity space is lp(pi)
with p ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,+∞}. 2
1Chichilnisky and Heal (1993) give a condition which implies the boundedness of the in-
dividually rational feasible set in L2. Since the feasible set is closed, it is therefore weakly
compact in L2.
2We use the model proposed by Hart. Investors are interested only in their wealth in the sec-
ond period. We suppose that the market is complete with an asset system (r1, r2, . . . , rk, . . . ).
For each portfolio z = (z1, z2, . . . , zk, . . . ), the wealth or investor if state s occurs is
ws =
∑
k
zkrks .
Her expected utility is:
V (w1, w2, . . . , ws, . . . ) =
∑
s
pisu(ws).
Since the market is complete, the choice of portfolio is equivalent to the choice of wealth.
As in Hart’s pioneer paper, we consider the expected utility function on wealth.
2
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When the number of states is infinite, the no-arbitrage condition (a` la
Werner or a` la Dana-Le Van) only ensures the boundedness of the individ-
ually rational utility set. We give examples where this condition is satisfied and
no equilibrium exists. The strategy is therefore to give assumptions which im-
ply the compactness of the individually rational utility set and hence existence
of equilibrium. Our conditions might be considered as among the weakest since
we give also examples of non existence of equilibrium when these conditions do
not hold.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and
define the equilibrium. In section 3, we introduce no-arbitrage conditions and
give conditions for the existence of equilibrium. Proofs are put in Section
Appendix, Section 4. We mention that our methods of proofs are inspired
by the ones in Le Van and Truong Xuan (2001). However, their model rules
out the risk-neutral agents. That is not the case in our model.
2 The model
There are m agents indexed by i = 1, . . . ,m. The belief of agent i in state s is
piis ≥ 0, and
∑∞
s=1 pi
i
s = 1 . Let us denote by pi the mean probability
1
m
∑
i pi
i.
We first assume:
A0: pii is equivalent to pij for any i, j i.e. there exists a number h > 0 such
that h ≤ piis
pijs
≤ 1h for all i, j, s.3
Under A0, without loss of generality, one can assume that piis > 0 for any i,
any s. In this paper, we always suppose that the condition A0 is satisfied and
piis > 0 for any i, any s.
The consumption set of agent i is Xi = lp(pi) with p ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,+∞} and
agent i has an endowment ei ∈ lp(pi). We assume that for each agent i there
exists a concave, strictly increasing, differentiable 4 function ui : R→ R , such
that, for any i, the function
U i(xi) =
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis)
is real-valued for any xi ∈ Xi.
Agent i has lp(pi) as consumption set, ei as initial endowment and U i as
utility function, with i = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a list
(
(x∗i)i=1,...,m, p∗)
)
such that x∗i ∈ Xi for
every i and p∗ ∈ lq+(pi) \ {0} and
3With A0, the consumptions set of the agents belong to same topological space lp(pi).
We observe that when all agents have the same belief as in Cheng (1991), then A0 is satisfied.
4For simplicity, we assume differentiability. The results still hold by using super-gradients.
But the proofs will become tedious.
3
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(i) For any i, U i(x) > U i(x∗i)⇒∑∞s=1 p∗sxs >∑∞s=1 p∗seis,
(ii)
∑m
i=1 x
∗i =
∑m
i=1 e
i.
Definition 2 A quasi-equilibrium is a list
(
(x∗i)i=1,...,m, p∗)
)
such that xi∗ ∈ Xi
for every i and p∗ ∈ lq+(pi) \ {0} and
(i) For any i, U i(x) > U i(x∗i)⇒∑∞s=1 p∗sxs ≥∑∞s=1 p∗seis,
(ii)
∑m
i=1 x
∗i =
∑m
i=1 e
i.
In this paper, since the consumption set is the whole space, and the utility
functions U i are continuous, any quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium (see e.g.
Geistdoerfer-Florenzano (1982), Proposition 3).
Define
ai = inf
x
ui′(x) = ui′(+∞),
bi = sup
x
ui′(x) = ui′(−∞).
Let I1 be the set of indices i such that a
i < bi, and I2 be the set of indices such
that ai = bi. I1 is the set of risk averse agents, I2 is the set of risk neutral ones.
We now give some definitions.
Definition 3 1. The individually rational attainable allocations set A is de-
fined by
A = {(xi) ∈ (lp(pi))m |
m∑
i=1
xi =
m∑
i=1
ei and U i(xi) ≥ U i(ei) for all i}.
2. The individually rational utility set U is defined by
U = {(v1, v2, ..., vm) ∈ Rm | ∃x ∈ A s.t U i(ei) ≤ vi ≤ U i(xi) for all i}.
3 No-arbitrage condition and existence of equilib-
rium
We will first strengthen the definition of useful vectors introduced by Werner.
We then introduce a notion of no-arbitrage price based on these strong useful
vectors.
A vector w is strongly useful for agent i if, for any xi ∈ Xi, we have
(i)
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis + λws) ≥
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis),∀λ ≥ 0,
and (ii)
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis + λws) >
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis) for some λ > 0.
4
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.62
It is easy to check that a vector w is strongly useful for agent i if, and only if
∀xi ∈ Xi,∃λ¯ > 0,∀λ ≥ λ¯,
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis + λws) >
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis).
This condition turns out to be equivalent to
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i′(xis)ws > 0,∀xi ∈ Xi.
Following Dana and Le Van [8], we now introduce a no-arbitrage condition.
(NA) There exist (x¯i)mi=1 ∈ ΠiXi, such that
λipiisu
i′(x¯is) = λ
jpijsu
j′(x¯js) = λ
kakpi
k
s , ∀s, ∀i ∈ I1, ∀j ∈ I1, ∀k ∈ I2,
and
∀i ∈ I1, ai < inf
s
ui′(x¯is) < sup
s
ui′(x¯is) < b
i.
Observe that if we define a price p ∈ l∞+ (pi) by
∀s, ps = λipiisui′(x¯is) = λkakpiks , i ∈ I1, k ∈ I2
then we have p · w > 0 for any strongly useful vector w.
Condition (NA) is useful to prove the boundedness of U . That is the state-
ment of the following proposition. The proof is given in Appendix.
Proposition 1 If (NA) holds, then U is bounded.
The next proposition and its corollary give sufficient conditions to obtain
(NA).
Proposition 2 Assume either ui′(−∞) = +∞ for all i ∈ I1 or ui′(+∞) = 0
for all i ∈ I1. Then (NA) holds if, and only if, pii = pij, for any i ∈ I2, any
j ∈ I2.
The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1 If I2 = ∅, then (NA) holds if
(i) either ui′(−∞) = +∞ for all i ∈ I,
(ii) or ui′(+∞) = 0 for all i ∈ I.
In the case of finite number of states, condition (NA) implies compactness of
U .
In infinite dimension, with a vector space L as commodity space, Brown
and Werner [4], Dana, Le Van and Magnien [10] assume the compactness of U
and get existence of equilibrium with prices in L′. In our model if the number
5
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of states is finite, condition (NA) implies compactness of U and is a sufficient
condition for the existence of equilibrium (see e.g. Dana and Le Van [8]).
In this paper, the number of states is infinite, we give an example which shows
that (NA) is not sufficient to ensure existence of equilibrium if the conditions
in Corollary 1 do not hold. We exhibit a model with two agents. Agent 1 has
a1 = 0, b1 < +∞. Agent 2 has a2 > 0, b2 = +∞. The assumptions of Proposi-
tions 4 and 6 are clearly not satisfied. We still have (NA) but no equilibrium
exists in this model.
Example 1 Consider an economy with two agents (i = 1, 2), with endowments
equal to 0. The probabilities are equivalent: pi1s =
(
1
2
)s
, pi2s =
1
Sα
1−αs
2s , where
1 < α < 1, and Sα =
∑
s
1−αs
2s .
The reward utilities satisfy
u1′(x) = b1, ∀x ≤ 0,
u1′(+∞) = 0,
u1(0) = 0,
u2′(x) = a2, ∀x ≥ 0,
u2′(−∞) = +∞,
u2(0) = 0.
There exists z > 0 with u1′(z) < b1. Let x1s = z,∀s. Since u2′(−∞) = +∞,
there exists x2s < 0 which satisfies
u2′(0) = (1− αs)u2′(x2s).
One can check that
λpi1su
1′(x1s) = pi
2
su
2′(x2s),∀s,
with λ = u
2′(0)
u1′(z) × 1Sα . Since
0 = u1′(+∞) < u1′(z) = u1′(x1s) < b1,
a2 = u2′(0) <
u2′(0)
1− αs = u
2′(x2s) < u
2′(−∞) = +∞,
no-arbitrage condition (NA) is satisfied.
We now show that no equilibrium exists. Assume there exists an equilibrium
(p, (x1, x2)) with x1s = xs = −x2s. We have
∀s, λ1pi1su1′(xs) = λ2pi2su2′(−xs),
or λpi1su
1′(xs) = pi2su
2′(−xs), with λ = λ1
λ2
.
6
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For all s:
λ′
1
2s
u1′(xs) =
1− αs
2s
u2′(−xs),
or equivalently
λ′ = (1− αs)u
2′(−xs)
u1′(xs)
, ∀s
with λ′ = λSα. Since
∑
s psxs = 0 and ps > 0 for any s, one must have s0 with
xs0 ≤ 0. In this case
λ′ = (1− αs0)a
2
b1
,
and for any s 6= s0, xs > 0. We then obtain
u2′(−xs0+1)
u1′(xs0+1)
>
u2′(0)
u1′(0)
=
a2
b1
since xs0+1 > 0. Now, because 1−αs0+1 > 1−αs0 we obtain, on the one hand:
λ′ = (1− αs0+1)u
2′(−xs0+1)
u1′(xs0+1)
> (1− αs0)u
2′(−xs0+1)
u1′(xs0+1)
> (1− αs0)a
2
b1
and on the other hand
λ′ = (1− αs0)a
2
b1
which is a contradiction. Then there exists no equilibrium.
We now state our main results. Their proofs are given in Appendix. The
ideas are to prove that the set A is l1(pi)-compact and hence the set U is also
compact when bi = +∞ for all i, and when ai = 0 for every i and bi < +∞ for
some i, the set A is not necessary l1(pi)-compact but the set U is still compact.
Theorem 1 Suppose one of these two conditions holds:
(i) ai = 0 for every i.
(ii) bi = +∞ for every i.
Then there exists an equilibrium with equilibrium price in lq(pi) with 1p +
1
q =
1, 1 ≤ p ≤ +∞.
Theorem 2 Suppose that I2 6= ∅. Suppose that these two conditions hold:
(i) ai = 0 for every i ∈ I1.
(ii) bi = +∞ for every i ∈ I1.
Then we have
(NA)⇔ ∃ Equilibrium.
The equilibrium price is in lq(pi) with 1p +
1
q = 1, 1 ≤ p ≤ +∞.
7
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We can be surprised that in presence of risk-neutral agents we have to impose
ui′(+∞) = 0 and ui′(−∞) = +∞ for any agent i ∈ I1. We give two examples
with two agents, one of them is risk neutral while the second one is risk averse.
In Example 2, the risk averse agent has the marginal utility at −∞ equal to
+∞. In Example 3, her the marginal utility at +∞ is 0. In both examples,
there exists no equilibrium.
Example 2 Consider an economy with two agents (i = 1, 2), with endowments
equal to 0. The probabilities are equivalent: pi1s =
(
1
2
)s
, pi2s =
1
Sα
1−αs
2s , where
1 < α < 1, and Sα =
∑
s
1−αs
2s . Agent 1 is risk neutral.
The reward utilities satisfy
u1′(x) = 1, ∀x ∈ R,
u2′(x) = a2, ∀x ≥ 0,
u2′(−∞) = +∞,
u2′(x) > a2, ∀x < 0.
Assume there exists an equilibrium (p, (x1, x2)). Then x1s = −x2s = xs for any
s. There exists λ > 0 such that
λ
2s
u1′(xs) =
1− αs
Sα2s
u2′(−xs)∀s
⇔ u2′(−xs) = λ Sα
1− αs∀s.
Since
∑
s psxs = 0 and ps > 0 for all s, there exists xs0 ≤ 0, i.e −xs0 ≥ 0.
Then
a2 = λ
Sα
1− αs0
and ∀s 6= s0, xs > 0. Hence u2′(−xs0+1) > a2. This implies
λ
Sα
1− αs0+1 > λ
Sα
1− αs0 ⇒ α
s0+1 > αs0 .
A contradiction.
Example 3 Agent 2 is risk neutral. The reward utilities satisfy
u1′(x) = b1, ∀x ≤ 0,
u1′(+∞) = 0,
u1′(x) < b1, ∀x > 0,
u2′(x) = 1, ∀x ∈ R.
8
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Assume there exists an equilibrium (p, (x1, x2)). Then x1s = −x2s = xs for any
s. There exists λ > 0 such that
u1′(xs) = λ
1− αs
Sα
∀s.
Since
∑
s psxs = 0 and ps > 0 for all s, there exists xs0 ≤ 0, i.e −xs0 ≥ 0.
Then
b1 = λ
1− αs0
Sα
and ∀s 6= s0, xs > 0. Hence u1′(xs0+1) < b1. This implies
λ
1− αs0+1
Sα
< λ
1− αs0
Sα
⇒ αs0+1 > αs0 .
A contradiction.
Remark 1 When there are short-sales constraints, the allocation set A is com-
pact in lp(pi) for any p. Indeed, suppose we have short-sales constraints xis ≥ cs
for every i, s, with c = (c1, c2, . . . , cs, . . . ) ∈ lp(pi). We also have for every
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) which belongs to A:
xis = es −
∑
j 6=i
xjs ≤ es −
∑
j 6=i
cs ≤ |es|+ (m− 1)|cs|.
A is hence compact for the product topology. Suppose that the sequence (x1(n), x2(n), . . . , xm(n))
belong to A converges to (x1, x2, . . . , xm) for the product topology when n tends
to infinity. We have for every i,
cs ≤ xis ≤ |es|+ (m− 1)|cs|.
This implies that (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ lp(pi). The set of individually rational al-
locations A is compact in lp(pi). That implies the compactness of U and the
existence of a quasi-equilibrium. This explain why in our paper we assume no
short-sales constraints.
Concluding remarks (a) In our model with an infinitely countable number
of states of nature, the sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
are:
(i) Either the marginal utilites at +∞ equal zero for all the agents,
(ii) or the marginal utilites at −∞ equal +∞ for all the agents.
We give examples where agents do not satisfy the conditions above. Their
utility functions satisfy the no-arbitrage condition a` la Werner. However there
is no equilibrium.
9
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(b) Our sufficient conditions differ from the ones in Le Van and Truong Xuan
(Assumption H4) [16], and Daher, Martins-da-Rocha, Vailakis, [11] (Assump-
tion S4). Put in our model, these conditions are stronger than ours. Indeed,
they imply, for our model, that for all the agents, the marginal utilities at +∞
equal zero and the marginal utilities at −∞ equal +∞.
4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Take any NA-price p. There exists (xi), λ1, λ2, . . . , λm positive such that
for all i, s: ps = λ
ipiisu
i′(xis).
(i) For i, j ∈ I2 we have λiaipiis = λjajpijs, ∀s. Take the sum we have:
∞∑
s=1
λiaipiis =
∞∑
s=1
λjajpijs.
This implies λiai = λjaj , hence pii = pij .
(ii) We firstly prove that there exists C > 0 such that:
∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
piis|xis| ≤ C.
Define e′ = e−∑i∈I2 xi = ∑i∈I1 xi ∈ l1(pi).
For i ∈ I1, since ai < infs ui′(xis) ≤ sups ui′(xis) < bi, we have xi ∈ l∞(pi).
Observe that p ∈ l∞(pi).
Choose η > 0 such that
ai < ui′(xis)(1 + η) < b
i for
for all i ∈ I1. Then we define the price q as follows: ∀i, j ∈ I1,
qs = ps(1 + η) = λ
ipiisu
i′(xis)(1 + η) = λ
jpijsu
j′(xjs)(1 + η).
It follows that, for each i ∈ I1, there exist zi such that ∀s, qs = λipiisui′(zis).
Observe that ai < infs u
i′(zis) ≤ sups ui′(zis) < bi, so zi ∈ l∞(pi). Observe also
that ∀s, ps < qs.
Denote
x+ : =
{
x if x > 0,
0 if x ≤ 0
x− : =
{
−x if x < 0,
0 if x ≥ 0
Observe that x = x+−x−, |x| = x++x− and u(x) = u(x+)+u(−x−)−u(0).
10
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Now we fix N ∈ N. For i ∈ I1, from the concavity of the utility function ui
we have
λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis)− λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i(xi+s ) ≥ λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(xis)(x
i
s − xi+s ),
λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i(zis)− λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i(−xi−s ) ≥ λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(zis)(z
i
s + x
i−
s ).
Therefore,
λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(zis)x
i−
s ≤ λi
N∑
s=1
piis[u
i(zis) + u
i(xis)− ui(xi+s )− ui(−xi−s )]
−λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(zis)z
i
s + λ
i
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(xis)x
i+
s − λi
N∑
s=1
piisu
i′(xis)x
i
s.
Define U iN (x) :=
∑N
s=1 pi
i
su
i(xs). Note that limN→∞ U iN (x) = U
i(x). The
above inequality implies
N∑
s=1
qsx
i−
s ≤ λi[U iN (zi) + U iN (xi)− U iN (xi)− U iN (0)]
−
N∑
s=1
qsz
i
s +
N∑
s=1
psx
i+
s −
N∑
s=1
psx
i
s
≤ λi[U iN (zi) + U iN (xi)− U iN (xi)− U iN (0)]
−
N∑
s=1
pisx
i
s −
N∑
s=1
qsz
i
s +
N∑
s=1
psx
i+
s
= CiN +
N∑
s=1
psx
i+
s
where CiN = λ
i[U iN (z
i) + U iN (x
i)− U iN (xi)− U iN (0)]−
∑N
s=1 p
i
sx
i
s −
∑N
s=1 qsz
i
s.
Observe that since xi et zi belong to l∞(pi), the limit limN CiN exists.
Hence, ∀i
N∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xi−s ≤ CiN +
N∑
s=1
psx
i
s.
Thus, we have
∑
i∈I1
N∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xi−s ≤
∑
i∈I1
CiN +
∑
i∈I1
N∑
s=1
psx
i
s =
∑
i∈I1
CiN +
N∑
s=1
pse
′
s.
Since e′ ∈ l1(pi), ∑i∈I1 CiN + ∑Ns=1 pse′s converges. Now let N tends to
infinity. Notice that U iN (x)→ U i(x) for all x, and recall that U i(xi) ≥ U i(ei),
11
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with xi, zi ∈ l∞(pi). We then have
lim sup
N→∞
CiN ≤ λi[U i(zi) + U i(xi)− U i(ei)− U i(0)]−
∞∑
s=1
qsz
i
s −
∞∑
s=1
psx
i
s =: C
i.
Thus, ∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xi−s ≤
∑
i∈I1
Ci +
∞∑
s=1
pse
′
s =: C1 +
∞∑
s=1
pse
′
s.
We also have∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)(xi+s − xi−s ) =
∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xis =
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)e′s
which implies
∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xi+s =
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)e′s +
∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)xi−s
≤ C1 +
∞∑
s=1
pse
′
s +
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)e′s
= C1 +
∞∑
s=1
qse
′
s.
Thus for i ∈ I1
∞∑
s=1
(qs − ps)|xis| ≤ 2C1 +
∞∑
s=1
(ps + qs)e
′
s
= 2C1 + (2 + η)
∞∑
s=1
pse
′
s
= 2C1 + (2 + η)
∞∑
s=1
pses − (2 + η)
∑
i∈I2
∞∑
s=1
psx
i
s
= 2C1 + (2 + η)
∞∑
s=1
pses − (2 + η)
∑
i∈I2
λiai
∞∑
s=1
piisx
i
s
= 2C1 + (2 + η)
∞∑
s=1
pses − (2 + η)
∑
i∈I2
λiU i(xi)
≤ 2C1 + (2 + η)
∞∑
s=1
pses − (2 + η)
∑
i∈I2
λiU i(ei)
= C2,
then
η
∞∑
s=1
ps|xis| ≤ C2.
12
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Let µi := infs u
i′(x¯is) > 0, and µ := mini µi. Then
∑∞
s=1 ps|xis| ≥ µ
∑∞
s=1 pi
i
s|xis|
which implies for all i ∈ I1 ∞∑
s=1
piis|xis| ≤ D1
with D1 = C
2/(ηµ).
For I2 we have:
∞∑
s=1
piIs |
∑
i∈I2
xis| ≤
∞∑
s=1
piIs |es|+
∑
i∈I1
∞∑
s=1
piis|xis|
≤ D2
with D2 =
∑∞
s=1 pi
I
s |es|+ |I1|D1.
We take C = max{D1, D2}.
(iii) By Jensen inequality, the utility set U is bounded.
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Consider the case where I2 = ∅.
(a) Assume ui′(−∞) = +∞, for any i. Let z satisfy a1 < u1′(z). For i > 1,
let
ζis =
pi1s
piis
u1′(z),∀s.
Then 1hu
1′(z) ≥ ζis ≥ hu1′(z). One can find λi s.t. ζ
i
s
λi
≥ αi > ai. Define
ui′(xis) =
ζis
λi
, ∀s.
Then
ai < αi ≤ ui′(xis) ≤
1
λih
u1′(z),∀s
Since bi = +∞, we have xi ∈ l∞(pi). Obviously
λipiisu
i′(xis) = pi
1
su
1′(z),∀s.
(b) Assume ui′(+∞) = 0 for all i. Let z satisfy 0 < u1′(z) < b1. Define ζis
as before. We have ζis ≤ 1hu1′(z). Choose λi s.t.
ζis
λi
≤ βi < bi. Then define xis as before. Using the same arguments, we have
λipiisu
i′(xis) = pi
1
su
1′(z),∀s.
(ii) Now we consider the case where I2 6= ∅. If (NA) holds, let p be a
(NA)-price. There exists (xi), λ1, λ2, . . . , λm positive such that for all i, s we
have ps = λ
ipiisu
i′(xis).
For i, j ∈ I2 we have λiaipiis = λjajpijs, ∀s. Taking the sum we have:
∞∑
s=1
λiaipiis =
∞∑
s=1
λjajpijs.
13
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This implies λiai = λjaj , hence pii = pij .
Conversely, assume that pik = pil = pi′,∀k ∈ I2,∀l ∈ I2. Assume 1 ∈ I2. For
i ∈ I2, i 6= 1, choose λi such that λiai = a1.
Consider the case ui′(−∞) = +∞, ∀i ∈ I1.
For i ∈ I1, define ζis:
1
h
a1 ≥ ζis =
a1pi1s
piis
≥ a1h
There exists λi s.t.
ζis
λi
≥ αi > ai
and
ai < ui′(xis) =
ζis
λi
≤ 1
h
a1.
Since bi = +∞, we have xi ∈ l∞(pi). Obviously
λipiisu
i′(xis) = pi
1
su
1′(z),∀s.
We use the same argument as before if ui′(+∞) = 0,∀i ∈ I1.
Proofs of Theorems 1, 2
The proofs require many intermediary steps.
Claims 1, 2 and 3 are required for the proof of Claim 4.
Claim 1 Assume A0. Our model has an equilibrium if we add the assumption
that U is compact. If Xi is lp(pi) with 1 ≤ p < +∞ then the equilibrium price
p∗ is in lq(pi), 1p +
1
q = 1. If p = +∞, then p∗ ∈ l1(pi).
Proof : Since U is compact and Xi is lp(pi) there exists an equilibrium ((x∗i), p∗)
(see Dana and al [9]) with x∗i ∈ lp(pi).
When 1 ≤ p < +∞, the price p∗ belongs to lq(pi). When p = ∞ we will
show that the equilibrium price belongs to l1(pi). The equilibrium price can be
written as p∗ + φ where p∗ ∈ l1(pi) and φ is a purely finitely additive function.
For any i, the equilibrium allocation x∗i solves the problem:
max
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis),
s.t.
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
i
s + φ(x
i) =
∞∑
s=1
p∗se
i
s + φ(e
i).
From Theorem V.3.1, page 91, in Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa in [2], for any i,
there exists ζi > 0 s.t.
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(x∗is )− ζi(
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
∗i
s + φ(x
∗i)) ≥
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xs)− ζi(
∞∑
s=1
p∗sxs + φ(x
i)).
14
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Suppose that φ 6= 0. Since φ ≥ 0, then φ(1) > 0 , with 1 = (1, 1, 1, . . .).
Define xi(N) as:
xis(N) = x
∗i
s with s = 1, 2, . . . , N,
xis(N) = x
∗i
s − 1 with s ≥ N + 1.
Observe that xi(N) ∈ l∞(pi). We have:
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(x∗is )−ζi(
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
∗i
s +φ(x
∗i)) ≥
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis(N))−ζi(
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
i
s(N)+φ(x
i(N)))
⇒∑
s≥N+1
piisu
i(x∗is )−ζi(
∑
s≥N+1
p∗sx
∗i
s +φ(x
∗i)) ≥
∑
s≥N+1
piisu
i(x∗is −1)−ζi(
∑
s≥N+1
p∗s(x
∗i
s −1)+φ(x∗i−1))
⇒∑
s≥N+1
piisu
i(xi∗s )−
∑
s≥N+1
piisu
i(x∗is − 1)− ζi
∑
s≥N+1
p∗s ≥ ζi(φ(x∗i)− φ(x∗i − 1)) = ζiφ(1).
Let N → ∞, the left-hand-side converges to 0. This implies φ(1) ≤ 0: a
contradiction. Hence φ = 0.
Claim 2 A closed, bounded set B in l1(pi) is compact if and only if B satisfies
the following property: For all  > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that for all x ∈ B
we have ∑
s≥N
pis|xs| < .
Proof : Suppose that B is compact and there exists a subsequence {x(n)}n of
B,  > 0 such that
∞∑
s=n
pis|xs(n)| > ,∀n.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that x(n) converges to x in l1(pi) or
‖x(n)− x‖l1(pi) → 0.
By choosingN large enough such that ‖x(n)−x‖l1(pi) < 2 and
∑
s≥n pis|xs| <

2 for all n ≥ N . And for all n ≥ N , we have
∞∑
s=n
pis|xs| ≥
∞∑
s=n
pis|xs(n)| −
∞∑
s=n
pis|xs(n)− xs|
> − 
2
=

2
.
A contradiction.
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Now we suppose that for any  > 0, there exists N such that ∀x ∈ B,∑∞
s=N pis|xs| < .
We have to prove that for any sequence x(n) ∈ B, there exists a convergent
subsequence of x(n) in l1(pi).
SinceB is bounded in l1(pi), there exists a > 0 such that, ∀ x ∈ B, ∑s≥1 pis|xs| ≤
a.
Since {x(n)}n belong to a compact set for the product topology, there exists
a subsequence {x(nk)}k which converges to x for the product topology. In
particular for all s, xs(nk) converges to xs when k →∞.
Fix  > 0. We will prove that for k, l big enough, ‖x(nk)− x(nl)‖l1(pi) < .
Choose N > 0 such that for all x ∈ B, ∑s≥N pis|xs| < 4 . Choose M such that
for all nk > M we have
∑M
s=1 pis|xs(nk) − xs| < 4 . For all nk ≥ N0, nl ≥ N0
where N0 = max{N,M} we have
∑N0
s=1 pis|xs(nk)−xs(nl)| ≤
∑N0
s=1 pis|xs(nk)−
xs|+
∑N0
s=1 pis|xs(nk)− xs| < 2 .
Then
∑
s≥1
pis|xs(nk)− xs(nl)| ≤
N0−1∑
s=1
pis|xs(nk)− xs(nl)|+
∑
s≥N0
pis|xs(nk)|+
∑
s≥N0
pis|xs(nl)|
< 
Hence {x(nk)}k is a Cauchy sequence, then it converges in l1(pi) topology. So
B is compact in l1(pi) topology.
The following claim is a corollary of Claim 2.
Claim 3 1. A closed, bounded set B in l1(pi) is compact for l1(pi)-topology if
and only if it is compact for the weak topology σ(l1(pi)), l∞(pi)).
2. A closed, bounded set B in lp(pi), p > 1 is compact for l1(pi).
Proof : 1. Since Lemma 2 is equivalent to the Dunford-Pettis criterion, the
result follows.
2. For p > 1, a closed bounded set is σ(lp(pi), lq(pi))-compact. But it is also
σ(l1(pi), l∞(pi))-compact, since lp(pi) ⊂ l1(pi) and l∞(pi) ⊂ lq(pi). Apply state-
ment 1.
Claim 4 Assume A0. If bi = +∞ for all i, then the allocation set A is l1(pi)-
compact. The set U is also compact.
Proof : The idea of the proof is that, if the attainable allocation sequence does
not belong to a weakly compact set, then for some state s, there will be an
agent i such that xis tends to +∞ and an agent j such that xjs tends to −∞.
Then by reducing xis and increasing x
j
s, the value of U i(xi) does not diminish
16
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very much. Because bj = +∞, the value of U j(xj) will become very large,
even tends to infinity, and that leads us to a contradiction with the bounded
property of U .
Assume the contrary: A is not compact. Then from Claim 2, there exists
a sequence {(x1(n), x2(n), ..., xm(n))}n ⊂ A, an agent i and a constant  > 0
such that
∀ n,
∞∑
s=n
piis|xis(n)| > .
Denote for all k, vk := lim supn→∞ Uk(xk(n)).
By Proposition 1, A is bounded in l1(pi). We can suppose, without loss gen-
erality, that
∑∞
s=n pi
i
s|xis(n)| → ci > 0 when n→∞. This implies limn
∑∞
s=n pi
i
sx
i+
s (n)−
limn
∑∞
s=n pi
i
sx
i−
s (n) = c
i. The limits of these two sums exist because xi ∈ l1(pi).
We know that
∑
j 6=i x
i
s(n) = es − xis(n). So, for every s, ∃j such that xjs(n) ≤
−xis(n)−|es|m−1 . Since there is a finite number of agents j 6= i, we can assume that,
for simplicity, there exist i and j which satisfy two properties:
(i) ∃ Ein ⊂ N ∩ {s ≥ n}, xis > 0 for all s ∈ Ein and
lim
n
∑
s∈Ein
piisx
i
s(n) = c
i > 0.
(ii) For all s ∈ Ein
xjs(n) ≤ −
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 .
With each M > 0, define the set Sin ⊂ Ein as follows
Sin = {s : xis(n) > |es|+M(m− 1)}.
We have an observation: limn
∑
Ein\Sin pi
i
sx
i
s(n) = 0. Indeed
lim
n→∞
∑
s∈Ein\Sin
piisx
i
s(n) ≤
∑
s∈Ein\Sin
piis (|es|+M(m− 1))
≤
∞∑
s=n
piis|es|+M(m− 1)
∞∑
s=n
piis
which tends to zero, since e ∈ l1(pi).
Hence we have Sin 6= ∅ for all n big enough, and
lim
n→∞
∑
s∈Sin
piisx
i
s(n) = c
i.
We have
xjs(n) ≤
|es| − xis(n)
m− 1 < −M.
17
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Since pii and pij are equivalent, we can assume that limn
∑
s∈Sin pi
j
sxis(n) = c
j >
0. Notice that these limits do not depend on M .
Define α := min(vk, vi − ui′(0)cim−1 ) − 1, (k = 1, . . . ,m). Define Aα the set of
(xk) ∈ l1(pi) satisfies Uk(xk) ≥ α ∀k and ∑xk = e. Using the same proof
as in Proposition 1, we show there exists C > 0 such that U j(xj) < C for all
(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Aα. Notice that our sequence (xk(n)) belongs to Aα for n large
enough.
Since bj = +∞ we can choose M very big such that
vj +
uj′(−M)cj
m− 1 > C.
Now consider the sequence (y1(n), y2(n), . . . , ym(n)) defined as follows
yis(n) := x
i
s(n)−
xis − |es|
m− 1 +M with s ∈ S
i
n,
yjs(n) := x
j
s(n) +
xis − |es|
m− 1 −M with s ∈ S
i
n.
Let yks = x
k
s with every k 6= i, j or s /∈ Sin.
Notice that
∑
i y
i(n) = e, and yis(n) ≤ xis(n), yjs(n) ≥ xjs(n) for all s. We
will prove that {U l(yl(n))}l=1,m is bounded below by α, but U j(yj(n)) is not
bounded above by C. And this is a contradiction.
Indeed,
U i(yi(n))− U i(xi(n)) =
∑
s∈Sin
piis(u
i(yis(n))− ui(xis(n)))
≥
∑
s∈Sin
piisu
i′(xis(n)−
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 +M)(−
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 +M)
≥
∑
s∈Sin
piisu
i′(M)(− x
i
s(n)
m− 1) + u
i′(M)(
|es|
m− 1 +M)
∑
s∈Sin
piis
≥ −u
i′(M)
m− 1
∑
s∈Sin
piisx
i
s(n) + u
i′(M)(
|es|
m− 1 +M)
∑
s∈Sin
piis.
When n → ∞, the second term of the right hand side term in the inequality
above tends to zero while first term tends to −ui′(M)cim−1 . Thus,
lim sup
n→∞
U i(yi(n)) ≥ vi − u
i′(M)ci
m− 1 ≥ v
i − u
i′(0)ci
m− 1 > α.
For n large enough, Uk(yk(n)) is bounded below by α,∀k 6= j. Then we can
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estimate the limit of U j(yj(n)) when n→∞,
U j(yj(n))− U j(xj(n)) =
∑
s∈Sin
pijs(u
j(yjs(n))− uj(xjs(n)))
≥
∑
s∈Sin
pijsu
j′(xjs(n) +
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 −M)(
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 −M)
≥
∑
s∈Sin
pijsu
j′(−M)(x
i
s(n)− |es|
m− 1 −M)
≥ u
j′(−M)
m− 1
∑
s∈Sin
pijsx
i
s(n)−Muj′(−M)
∑
s∈Sin
pijs −
uj′(−M)
m− 1
∑
s∈Sin
|es|pijs.
Take the limit
lim sup
n→∞
U j(yj(n)) ≥ vj + u
j′(−M)cj
m− 1 > C.
A contradiction. Hence A is l1(pi)-compact.
The proof of Claim 6 requires Claim 5
Claim 5 Suppose that A is bounded and (v1, v2, . . . , vm) is in the closure of
U . Suppose that there exists a sequence {x(n)}n ⊂ A such that there exists i
such that limn U
i(xi(n)) > vi, and for all j 6= i , limn U j(xj(n)) ≥ vj. Then
(v1, v2, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
Proof : Fix t ∈ N arbitrarily. Let C > 0 be the upper bound of A in l1(pi), we
know that |xjt (n)| < Cpijt for all j and all n. Fix some j. We define the sequence
{yk(n)}k=1,...,m as follows
yk(n) = xk(n) if k 6= i, j,
yis(n) = x
i
s(n) if s 6= t,
yit(n) = x
i
t(n)− ,
yjt (n) = x
j
t (n) + .
For k 6= i, j, limn Uk(yk(n)) = vk. And we have
U i(yi(n))− U i(xi(n)) = piit(ui(yit(n))− ui(xit(n)))
≥ piit(−)ui′(xit(n)− ) ≥ −piitui′(−
C
piit
− )
and
U j(yj(n))− U j(xj(n)) = pijt (uj(yjt (n))− uj(xjt (n)))
≥ pijt uj′(xjt (n) + ) ≥ pijtuj′(
C
pijt
+ ).
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Since lim infn U
i(xi(n)) > vi, by choosing  small enough, the sequence {y(n)}n
will satisfy lim infn U
i(yi(n)) > vi and lim infn U
j(yj(n)) > vj .
By induction we can find a sequence {zk(n)}n ⊂ A which satisfies limn Uk(zk(n)) >
vk for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Hence (v1, v2, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
Claim 6 Assume A0. If ai = 0 for all i, then U is compact.
Proof : Since the (NA) condition holds, from Proposition 1, we know that U is
bounded. We will prove that U is closed. Suppose that (v1, . . . , vm) belong to
the closure of U and the sequence {x(n)}n ⊂ A such that limn U i(xi(n)) = vi.
If the sequence {x(n)}n belongs to a compact set of l1(pi), without loss of
generality, we can suppose that limn x
i(n) = xi in this topology. Since U i is
continuous, we have U i(xi) ≥ vi for all i. Thus (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
If the sequence {x(n)}n does not belong to a compact set, we can suppose
that there exists c > 0 such that for an agent i
lim
n→∞
∞∑
s=n
piis|xis(n)| = c.
As in the proof of Claim 4, we can choose a pair (i, j) which satisfies the
two properties:
(i) ∃ Ein ⊂ N ∩ {s ≥ n}, xis > 0 for all s ∈ Ein and
lim
n
∑
s∈Ein
piisx
i
s(n) = c
i > 0.
(ii) For all s ∈ Ein
xjs(n) ≤ −
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 .
With each M > 0, define the set Sin ⊂ Ein as follows
Sin = {s : xis(n) > |es|+M(m− 1)}.
We have an observation: limn
∑
Ein\Sin pi
i
sx
i
s(n) = 0. Indeed
lim
n→∞
∑
s∈Ein\Sin
piisx
i
s(n) ≤
∑
s∈Ein\Sin
piis (|es|+M(m− 1))
≤
∞∑
s=n
piis|es|+M(m− 1)
∞∑
s=n
piis
which tends to zero, since e ∈ l1(pi).
Hence we have Sin 6= ∅ for all n big enough, and
lim
n→∞
∑
s∈Sin
piisx
i
s(n) = c
i.
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We have
xjs(n) ≤
|es| − xis(n)
m− 1 < −M.
Since pii and pij are equivalent, we can assume that limn
∑
s∈Sin pi
j
sxis(n) = c
j >
0. Notice that these limits do not depend on M .
Define α := min(vk, vi − ui′(0)cim−1 ) − 1, (k = 1, . . . ,m). Define Aα the set of
(xk) ∈ l1(pi) satisfies Uk(xk) ≥ α ∀k and ∑xk = e. From Proposition 1 we
know that there exists C > 0 such that U j(xj) < C for all (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Aα.
Notice that our sequence (xk(n)) ∈ Aα for n large enough. Fix  > 0. Since
ui′(+∞) = 0 we can choose M > 0 such that ui′(M) < (m− 1)/c. By similar
arguments as in the proof of Claim 4, we can construct the sequence (yk(n))
such that:
lim
n→∞U
i(yi(n)) ≥ vi − u
i′(M)ci
m− 1
lim
n→∞U
j(yj(n)) ≥ vj + u
j′(−M)cj
m− 1
lim
n→∞U
k(yk(n)) = vk for all k 6= i, j
with ci, cj > 0 and ci < c and ci and cj do not depend on M .
So, for n large enough, U i(yi(n)) > vi − , and for all k 6= i, j, Uk(yk(n)) >
vk −  whereas limn U j(yj(n)) = vj + u
j′(−M)cj
m−1 > v
j + u
j′(0)cj
m−1 > v
j . Let → 0
and by applying Claim 5, we have (v1, v2, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
Proof of Theorem 1
This is a direct consequence of Claims 4, 6 and 1.
The proof of the last theorem, Theorem 2, requires Claims 7 and 8.
Claim 7 Assume A0. Assume that there is only one risk neutral agent, I2 =
{i0}. If ai = 0 and bi = +∞ for all i ∈ I1, then (NA) holds, and U is compact.
Proof : Condition (NA) holds as a direct consequence of Claim 1. Now we
prove that U is compact.
Suppose that the feasible sequence {xn} satisfies limn U i(xin) = vi for every
i. We prove that (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
First case: the sequence {xn} belongs to a compact set, we have (v1, v2, . . . , vm)
belongs to U .
Second case: the sequence {xn} does not belong to a compact set. By using
the same arguments in the proof of Proposition 4, there exist i and j which
satisfy two properties:
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(i) ∃ Ein ⊂ N ∩ {s ≥ n}, xis > 0 for all s ∈ Ein and
lim
n
∑
s∈Ein
piisx
i
s(n) = c
i > 0.
(ii) For all s ∈ Ein
xjs(n) ≤ −
xis(n)− |es|
m− 1 .
If j 6= i0, since bj = +∞, by using the same arguments as in the proof of
Proposition 4 we have a contradiction.
This implies j = i0. Hence i 6= i0, and we have ai = 0. By using the same
arguments in the proof of Proposition 6, we have (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ U .
Hence U is compact.
Claim 8 Let f1, . . . , fn, be n vectors in lp(pi), and p ∈ l∞(pi). Take any x ∈
lp(pi) such that p · x = p ·∑i f i. Then there exists x1, . . . , xn in lp(pi) such that∑
i x
i = x and p · xi = p · f i for all i.
Proof : This is true for n = 1. Suppose that the claim is true for n− 1. Take
any x1 such that p · x1 = p · f1. We have p · (x− x1) = p ·∑ni=2 f i. Using the
hypothesis of induction, there exists x2, . . . , xn such that
∑n
i=2 x
i = x−x1 and
p · xi = p · f i for all i.
Proof of Theorem 2
In the proof of Proposition 2, we have pii = pij = piI and λia
i = λja
j = ζ,
for all i, j ∈ I2. For xI ∈ l1(pi) satisfying xI =
∑
i∈I2 x
i, with xi ∈ l1(pi), define
U I(xI) =
∑
i∈I2
λiU
i(xi).
We consider now the economy EI with |I1| + 1 agents, |I1| agents who are
risk averse, with endowment ei, utility function U i, and the last agent (denoted
by I) with endowment eI =
∑
i∈I2 e
i, utility function U I . It is easy to verify
that agent I is risk neutral, with
U I(xIs) = ζ
∞∑
s=1
piIsx
I
s,
and the new economy satisfies (NA) condition. By Claim 7, this economy has
a compact rational utility set and have an equilibrium, denote by (p∗, x∗). For
all i ∈ I1, x∗i is the solution to
max
∞∑
s=1
piisu
i(xis)
s.t.
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
i
s =
∞∑
s=1
p∗se
i
s.
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and x∗I is the solution to
maxU I(xI)
s.t.
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
I
s =
∞∑
s=1
p∗se
I
s.
If U I(xi) > U I(x∗I), then p∗ · xi > p∗ · eI .
By the same arguments as in the proof of Claim 1, there exists λ∗i > 0,
λI > 0 such that for i ∈ I1, p∗s = λipiisui′(x∗is ). For I, we have p∗s = ζpiIs = λiaipiIs ,
∀i ∈ I2, ∀s. The function U I is strictly increasing, so
p∗ · x∗I = p∗ · e∗I = p∗ ·
∑
i∈I2
ei.
By Claim 8, for all i ∈ I2 there exists x∗i ∈ lp(pi) such that
∑
i∈I2 x
∗i = x∗I ,
and p∗ · x∗i = p∗ · ei, ∀i.
Fix i ∈ I2. Take xi such that U i(xi) > U i(x∗i). We prove that p∗ ·xi > p ·ei.
Indeed, we have
U i(xi) =
∞∑
s=1
aipiisx
i
s =
1
λi
∞∑
s=1
λia
ipiis =
1
λi
∞∑
s=1
p∗sx
i
s.
Hence U i(xi) > U i(x∗i) implies p∗ · xi > p∗ · x∗i = p∗ · ei.
From Claim 1, the equilibrium price p∗ is in lq(pi) with 1 ≤ p < +∞,
1
p +
1
q = 1 and if p = +∞, then p∗ ∈ l1(pi). We have proved that (p∗, (x∗i)i) is
an equilibrium of the model.
Conversely, suppose that the model has an equilibrium, then by using Propo-
sition 2, we have (NA). The proof of Theorem 2 is complete.
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